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OF BUBBLING POTS AND BANKRuPTCY ETmIcs:
A COMMENT ON WOLFRAM AND SMITH
Todd J Zywicki*
It is an honor for me to have two scholars as distinguished as Charles Wolfram1
and Gerald Smith2 contribute to this symposium issue and to comment on my
Article. They share a belief that the disinterestedness requirement is wrong in its
conception, at least as applied to professionals for a debtor in possession.
Nonetheless, I remain convinced that they still have not carried the burden of
showing why the disinterestedness standard should be abandoned for a debtor in
possession's professionals. Given the acknowledged benefits of disinterestedness for a trustee's professionals, they simply have not demonstrated why those
benefits should be foregone when a trustee is not appointed. While both articles
raise many interesting and valuable points, this comment will focus on just a few
of them.
I.

CHARLES WOLFRAM

Professor Wolfram's "confessions of an unrepentant non-draftsman" I provides
a frank and insightful look into the ALl drafting process and the difficulties of
dealing with the unique ethical issues raised in the bankruptcy context.' His
impressions as an "outsider" to the bankruptcy community provide a fresh and
useful look at some old bankruptcy debates.
Wolfram explains the process which led to the ALI's conclusion to take no
position on the issue of conflicts in bankruptcy and laments the current state of
the law and that an opportunity for needed reform was squandered.' Moreover,
he interprets the opposition of Judge Carolyn King in the ALl and Judge Edith
Jones in the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to loosening ethical
requirements for attorneys for a debtor in possession as evidence that they
believe that "bankruptcy conflict rules are just about right," expressing his view
that he "strongly disagree[s].''
While I do not purport to speak for Judge King nor Judge Jones on this issue, I
think that Professor Wolfram has misconstrued their and, by implication, my reasons for objecting to the efforts in the ALl and the NBRC to do away with disinterestedness for a debtor in possession's professionals. Speaking for myself, I
* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. I would like to thank Scott
Norberg and David Skeel for their comments on an earlier draft of this Comment.
1. Charles W. Wolfram, The Boiling Pot of Lawyer Conflicts in Bankruptcy, 18 Miss. C. L. REv. 383
(1998).
2. Gerald K. Smith, Standardsfor the Employment of Professionals in Bankruptcy Cases: A Response to
Professor Zywicki "s"Case For Retaining the DisinterestednessRequirement For Debtor in Possession's
Professionals," 18 Miss. C. L. REv. 327 (1998).
3. The reference here, of course, is to Grant Gilmore's famous "Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman."
Good Faith PurchaseIdea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA.
L. REv. 605 (1980-81).
4. Like Professor Hazard, Professor Wolfram is to be commended for his candor in describing the ALI's
rocky path through the bankruptcy minefield. Compare Wolfram, supra note 1, at manuscript 7, n.27.
5. Wolfram, supra note 1,at manuscript 11.
6. Id. at manuscript 11.
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agree with his diagnosis that the case law applying the Bankruptcy Code's ethical
rules can "charitably be characterized as chaos." 7 It is an ill-considered and
inconsistent hash of poor reasoning, archaic doctrine, and unpredictable results.
Thus, everything is not all right with how the conflicts rules have been applied
by the courts.
But the fact that the courts have misread the Code is not an argument for abandoning the concept of disinterestedness. The solution to this confusion and
inconsistency in interpreting the Code's requirement is for the courts to interpret
the conflicts rules in a more consistent and logical way. I think that the conflicts
rules as written are just about right, subject to the amendments discussed in my
Article and possible future targeted reforms. I agree, however, that the conflicts
rules as applied are a mess. Thus, just as the ALI's decision to take "no position"
should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the current state of the law governing bankruptcy ethics, 8 the retention of the prevailing Code language on disinterestedness also should not be read as satisfaction with the current sorry state of
the case law. Greater oversight by the Courts of Appeals to resolve some of the
problems in the case law is unquestionably warranted. Indeed, to reiterate a point
from my Article, if disinterestedness itself is a concept that is so unworkable as
to make judicial confusion inevitable, then this is an argument for abandoning it
in all cases, not just for debtors in possession. Yet, nobody has called for the
abolition of disinterestedness for trustees or their professionals on the grounds
that it is unworkable.
Wolfram's Article also illustrates the difficulties of dealing with conflicts of
interest in the special "context" of bankruptcy As Wolfram suggests, bankruptcy raises a number of unique and vexing ethical problems that frustrate easy
application of non-bankruptcy ethics rules to the bankruptcy context. While I
discuss a number of these factors at length in my primary Article, Wolfram highlights three of them: the difficulty of distinguishing litigation from non-litigation
matters in bankruptcy, bankruptcy's uniquely sordid history of corruption and
self-dealing, and the intertwining of ethical and substantive rules in bankruptcy.
As Wolfram notes, any further proposals for reform will require a firm grasp on
the unique "context" of bankruptcy to ensure that any changes actually improve
the operation of the system.
Finally, Wolfram's Article cautions against making changes in this area without
proper deliberation. Wolfram's refreshing candor shines through again in his
confession that because of the press of publication deadlines, the proposed
amendments to § 209 were "ill-drafted in some important respects" and "bore the
unfortunate appearance of an attempt to steal a march on those concerned to
maintain high standards of legal ethics among bankruptcy practitioners."10 As a
result, neither the ideas nor the language itself was given the thorough and elabo7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at manuscript
Id. at manuscript
Id. at manuscript
Id. at manuscript

1.
8.
12 and n.51.
14-15.
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rate "multiple-draft and multiple-layer review by several groups within the ALl"
which it normally would have received. Indeed, Judge King's comments in the
ALI reflect concern over the haste of the decision as much as the substance.
Regrettably, similar procedural defects characterized the NBRC's consideration
of the issue. 1 One can only hope that future consideration of the issue will proceed in an open and deliberative forum.
II.

GERALD SMITH

In his response to my Article, Gerald Smith raises two points that I want to
address briefly. First, he accuses me of promoting an inaccurate view of the historical record filled with sensationalist and irrelevant historical events. Second,
he rebukes me for perceived incivility in my remarks, classifying my observation
that the disinterestedness requirement falls hardest on large firms. His concerns
on both points are unjustified.
Smith characterizes my discussion of the history of bankruptcy ethics in this
century as "revisionist," and he favors me with setting "the record straight, even
though in a general way." 12 Given this build-up, it is somewhat disappointing
that the historical summary that he actually presents is an inaccurate, whitewashed rendition that ignores many relevant and pivotal episodes in the history
of bankruptcy ethics. Even more puzzling is his characterization of my view as a
"revisionist" view of history, considering that virtually all bankruptcy commentators agree with my interpretation of the historical record. Indeed, it is only
because this interpretation is so well-established and so widely accepted among
bankruptcy scholars and practitioners that I felt it unnecessary to include a
detailed recitation of that record in my Article. Given Smith's concerns, however, I will do so below.
Smith has three general criticisms regarding the brief historical discussion in
my paper. First, he claims that I rely on irrelevant historical incidents, such as
the Donovan Report, solely for their shock value. Second, he characterizes my
reading of the historical record as "revisionist," suggesting that my interpretation
is unique and idiosyncratic. Third, he claims that my revisionist view is also
inaccurate. He is wrong on all three counts.
Smith claims that the historical incidents that I describe are irrelevant to the
creation and persistence of the disinterestedness requirement. This position,
however, ignores that those historical abuses are merely symptoms of underlying
characteristics of the bankruptcy process itself. Some of the problems identified
in the Donovan Report were solved with administrative reforms, but Congress
noted their persistence in 1978 and commentators continue to note their presence
today. As the Court wrote in In re Kendavis Industries, "[i]t is interesting to note
that many of the comments made regarding the disinterestedness requirement at
11. See Todd J. Zywicki, Mend It, Don't End It: The Casefor Retaining the DisinterestednessRequirement
for Debtor in PossessionsProfessionals,18 Miss. C. L. REv. 291, 324 (1998).
12. Smith, supra note 2, at manuscript 8.
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early congressional hearings remain relevant today." 3 The absence of effective
creditor control and the vast powers given to debtor's counsel are central elements of the bankruptcy system today, and remain potential sources of self-dealing for bankruptcy attorneys. Thus, so long as the bankruptcy system maintains
the structural dynamics which make it prone to fraud and abuse, strict ethical
standards and diligent policing of those standards will be necessary.
Smith is also plainly wrong in tagging my interpretation as revisionist. Bankruptcy scholars are virtually unanimous in adopting my version of history.
Kenneth Klee has argued that the historical record compels retention of the disinterestedness requirement for debtor in possession's counsel, stating "I'm one of
the few people who, because of the sordid history of bankruptcy law, am fairly
happy with the status quo and would like to see careful study done before the
standards are departed from."" Similarly, Louis Robin has referred to the
"unfortunate history" that led to the enactment of the disinterestedness requirement for bankruptcy attorneys. 5 Judge Joel Pelofsky has observed, "I look at it
historically. One of the motivations for adopting the Bankruptcy Code was this
public perception that there was misconduct in the professional ranks of the
bankruptcy practice." 6 Justice Douglas, of course, was extremely critical of the
"many sordid chapters" in the history of bankruptcy fees. Echoing Douglas's
concerns, the Court in Kendavis Industries concluded that the disinterestedness
requirement was enacted in response to the "sordid history" of bankruptcy ethics.
Judge Leif Clark similarly observed that "the legislative history of the disinterestedness requirement in § 330(a) provides further insights relevant to the case at
bar," in that one purpose of the disinterestedness requirement was to "'guard
against a recurrence of the "sordid chapters" in the history of fees in corporate
reorganizations.' "17

All of these commentators agree that the enactment of the disinterestedness
standard was a deliberate response to widespread scandal, corruption, and selfdealing by bankruptcy attorneys. 18 Smith may disagree with the substance of my
argument, but he is simply incorrect in labeling it revisionist. In short, I share
the traditionalview that the disinterestedness requirement was enacted to thwart
widespread ethical misbehavior by attorneys, thereby rendering Smith's whitewashed version of history the revisionistversion.
13. In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 747 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
14. The Commission Proposalsthat are Most Likely to Succeed, 31 BANKR. COURT DECISIONS Issue 13, at 3
(November 11, 1997).
15. Louis S. Robin, Responses to Ethics and Service Working Group Proposals Concerning Conflicts of
Interests, 102 COM. L.J., 224, 225 (1997) (referring to "unfortunate history" which led to enactment of the disinterestedness standard).
16. Ethics: Is DisinterestednessStill a Viable Concept? A Discussion, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 201, 206
(1997) (statement of Judge Joel Pelofsky).
17. In re Office Prod. of Am., Inc., 136 B.R. 983, 989 n.2 (Bankr. WD. Tex. 1992) (quoting Kendavis Indus.,
91 B.R. at 747).
18. In addition, I have received comments on prior versions of this Article from many different people. See
Zywicki, supra note 11, at n.*. Of all of the people who have read various drafts of this Article, Smith is the
first to question the accuracy of the historical events recounted or their relevance to the original enactment of
the disinterestedness requirement.
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Moreover, the traditional view is well-grounded in the historical record.
Writing in 1938, Mitchell Dvoret observed that "[t]he Donovan Report was the
first thorough investigation of its kind conducted since the passage of the Act in
1898. It played an important part in molding the legislation that followed. It
formed the basis of the study for the Chandler Act."19 President Hoover's concern about problems in the bankruptcy system led him to order Congress to publish the Donovan Report.2" Hoover then commissioned his Solicitor General,
Thomas D. Thacher, to investigate bankruptcy law and practice, which resulted
in the submission of the Thacher Report to Congress.2 In turn, some of the ideas
in the Thacher Report eventually were incorporated into the Chandler Act.22
Prior to becoming Solicitor General, of course, Thacher was the Judge in the
Southern District of New York who had created the commission which generated
the Donovan Report. 23 In turn, Congress must have been aware of and concerned with the ethical state of the bankruptcy bar when it voted for heightened
ethical standards in the Chandler Act. Indeed, of a Chapter X trustee's professionals, attorneys were alone singled out and required to meet the strict standard
of disinterestedness." All of this taken together evidences an unquestionable
concern by Congress and President Hoover about the ethics of the bankruptcy
bar.
Smith, however, would have us ignore all of this contextual evidence and focus
2
only on the findings of William 0. Douglas's Protective Committee Study. "
Taking such a narrow view, however, is untenable. Douglas was intimately
involved in Donovan's investigation, and Donovan "acknowledged that without
[Douglas's] aid much of the research work relating to the Donovan Report could
not have been done."'26 Moreover, Douglas's Protective Committee Study cites to
the Donovan Report several times, particularly to illustrate the "unsavory reputa' and the low "calibre of some members of the bankruptcy
tion of bankruptcy" 27
19. Dvoret, infra note 23, at 198-99.
20. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 5, 29 (1995); HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 71st CONG., 3d SESS., DONOVAN REPORT (Comm. Print 1931).
21. Dvoret, infra note 23, at 199; S.Doc. No. 65, 72nd CONG., 1st SESS. (1932). The Thacher Report is
sometimes referred to as the Thacher-Garrison Report. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 29.
22. The recommendations of the Thacher Report were later introduced as the Hastings-Michener Bill, which
was defeated by the American Bar Association. Tabb, supra note 20, at 29. "However, some of the ideas in that
bill found their way into the Chandler Act." Id. Dvoret concludes that "[t]he bill was a little ahead of its time."
Dvoret, infra note 23, at 201.
23. See Mitchell S.Dvoret, Bankruptcy Under the ChandlerAct: Background, 27 GEO. L.J. 194, 199 (1938).
24. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 327.03-327.04[3][a], p. 327-14-29 (Lawrence P. King, 15th ed. 1996). In
part, this was because of the essential role played by lawyers in reorganization proceedings. As noted above,
however, the powerful role played by bankruptcy lawyers also puts them in a unique position to engage in selfdealing behavior, thereby necessitating a strict standard of disinterestedness.
25. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK,
ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (hereinafter, "REPORT
ON PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES"). The Report was issued in eight parts in the period from April 30, 1936 to
September 30, 1940. See Hopkirk, infra note 30, at 667 n. 13.
26. Dvoret, supra note 23, at 198.
27. 8 REPORT ON PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES, A Summary of the Law Pertainingto Equity and Bankruptcy
Reorganizationsand of the Commission s Conclusionsand Recommendations 64 n.9 (Sept. 30, 1940).
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bar, [who] by their abuses of the process and their evasion of devices which were
supposed to assure honest and equal treatment of creditors." 2 8 Thus, the
Protective Committee Study itself reflects Douglas's role in authoring the
Donovan Report and the influence it had in shaping his report. Moreover, the
Report of the Protective Committee Study was shaped by the overall context of
the bankruptcy system of the time and its effect on Douglas personally.
Even if the Report of the Protective Committee Study is examined in a vacuum, it contradicts Smith's whitewashed story. As the Courts in Kendavis
Industries and Office Products of America noted, the findings of the Protective

Committee Study in fact provided the foundation for the application of the disinterestedness requirement to bankruptcy attorneys.29 Douglas's criticisms of the
extent of the corruption and self-dealing in the bankruptcy system of the time did
not spare the bankruptcy bar. In his penetrating study of Douglas's contributions
to American bankruptcy law, John Hopkirk describes the scene in the hearing
room of the Protective Committee:
One after another a long procession of corporation officials, bankers, investment underwriters and their attorneys passed through the hearing room.
Frequently Douglas uncovered evidence of a single-minded pursuit of gain in
the course of which those investigated appeared to have abandoned the fiduciary
obligations of trustees, the duty of corporation officials to stockholders' interests, and the ethical standards of conduct supposedly adhered to by members of
the bar. While Douglas had some prior intimation of these lapses gained from
his brief, early work in the Wall Street law firm of Cravath, de Gersdoff, Swaine
& Wood, from his previous study of reorganization, and from prior investigation
of these same matters by others, apparently he was surprised to find such extensive evidence as was uncovered in this investigation."
28. 8 REPORT ON PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES, supra note 27, at 73 n.45.
29. In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 747 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (quoting Protective
Committee Report); In re Office Prod. of Am., Inc., 136 B.R. 983, 988 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (quoting
Kendavis Indus., 91 B.R. at 747).
30. John W Hopkirk, William 0. Douglas--His Work in PolicingBankruptcy Proceedings, 18 VAND. L. REV.
663, 668 (1964-65). According to Hopkirk, Douglas's experience working for the Cravath firm apparently left
Douglas with a negative impression of the bankruptcy system and the bankruptcy bar:
Douglas was not aware of the fact that legal services in reorganizations were often of great importance and that they could take many hours of a firm's time. He had his own experience as a young
associate in Cravath, de Gersdoff, Swaine, & Wood to draw upon. That experience may also have
suggested to him what his group declared might be the root of the difficulty.
Id at 673. Given that Douglas's negative impression of the bankruptcy bar was formed by his experience with
the Cravath firm and the fact that he was highly critical of the firm in his report, see e.g., 1 REPORT ON
PROTECTIVE CoMMITTEES,supra note 25, at 212 n.886, 220, it is strange that Smith relies on an excerpt from a
law review article written by Robert T. Swaine of the firm as a supposedly objective "summary" of the findings
of the Report. See Smith, supra note 2, at 334 n.26 (quoting Robert T. Swaine, "Democratization'"
of Corporate
Reorganizations,38 COLUM. L. REV. 256, 257-58 (1938)). Indeed, Swaine's antipathy for Douglas on a personal
level virtually leaps off the page. Swaine wrote that
[i]t is a common phenomenon of government that those who seek power often do so in the guise
(often sincere) of protecting a people, assumed to be incompetent to protect themselves, against
public enemies (often imaginary). All the elements of this phenomenon are to be found in the SEC
Reports and their recommendations.
Swaine at 257. Swaine's hatred for the report itself is also obvious. See id. at 259 (stating that the portrayal
drawn in the report "is drawn with colorful verbage which rivals the dime novel of the nineties and a degree of
dramatic excitement which rivals a modem Hollywood gangster thriller" and charging that the facts presented
were so inaccurate that they actually fell "materially short" of the SEC's own standards of truthfulness). In light
of this obvious animosity, Swaine is an unlikely source for Smith to quote for a summary of the conclusions of
the Protective Committee Study. See Swaine at 257 (describing Swaine's criticisms of Douglas and the Report
of the Protective Committee Study). Douglas was an associate of the Cravath firm from September 15, 1925, to
January 28, 1926, and again from October 1, 1926, to June 30, 1927. See Hopkirk, supra note 30, at 673 n.26.
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Hopkirk further observes that,
Douglas and his fellow investigators directed one of their most scathing attacks
at members of their own profession who by pyramiding the costs of reorganization ate still further into the assets of the bankrupt. In the investigators' minds
the crime was further compounded by the fact that these same lawyers at times
were responsible for the original dissipation of the assets. 1
If anything, criticism of the ethical practices of the bankruptcy bar in the final
Report of the Protective Committee Study was harsher still. Douglas wrote:
The depression with its consequent wave of security defaults presented the legal
profession with an unsurpassed opportunity to render genuine public service in
the rehabilitation of corporate enterprises in the interests of investors. Yet,
though there are, of course, exceptions, the profession by and large has not evidenced a desire to promote reorganization expeditiously, economically, and
solely in the interests of investors. On the contrary, it has evidenced ability and
ingenuity in furthering the interests of those who utilize the reorganization
processes to serve selfish ends. Many incidents of this nature will be described
in this report.
At this point we are particularly concerned with the shift of the reorganization
bar from standards of professional service to those of pecuniary gain. In its
avarice for reorganization fees the legal profession by and large has forsaken the
traditions of officers of the court and has become highly entrepreneurial in
nature. Futhermore, as we shall subsequently develop, members of the reorganization bar have not been reluctant to occupy inconsistent positions, and, under
the guise of disinterested service to the estate, to act as the faithful servant of
interests hostile to the investors.32
Douglas singled out the large firms of the era as the primary culprits.
[T]he vice is that the bar has been charging all that the traffic will bear. It has
forsaken the tradition that its members are officers of the court and should
request and expect only modest fees. This condition has prevailed to an extent
throughout the profession. And it is not a new development; it is a practice of
long standing. But it has been accentuated in [the] case of the financial bar,
which has been dominant in reorganizations. Part of this unseemly tendency of
the financial bar to demand huge fees may be due to the business cast of law
practice of that kind. Part may be due to overspecialization in financial centers
with large law offices composed of dozens of lawyers, a huge overhead, and
consequent artificial standards of the worth of legal services. In other words,
organization for the practice of law on the large scale of mass production has
contributed to the alleged necessity of computing legal fees on an overhead
rather than on a service basis. Part may be due to the fact that the practice of
financial law has been to a great extent monopolized by relatively few firms.
31. Hopkirk, supra note 30, at 672-73.

32. 1 REPORT

ON PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES,

Committees 212-13 (May 10, 1937).

Strategy and Techniques of Protective and Reorganization
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This has meant setting monopolistic prices on the legal services of the select
financial bar. But whatever may have been the cause, the end result has been that
more conservative and modest professional standards have been discarded.33
Moreover, contrary to Smith's understanding, the Report speaks directly to the
attorneys' conflicts of interest and the necessity for disinterested counsel in the
reorganization context.
But there are stakes in addition to direct compensation. Counsel for the company will be desirous of continuing as counsel for the new, or reorganized, company. The value of their professional reputations may give them an interest in protecting the management against the assertion of claims based on fraud or mismanagement, for often the acts or omissions upon which such claims will be
asserted would have received their express approval, or at least their countenance. The same observations are apt with respect to counsel for the bankers.
To receive the benefits of both direct and indirect rewards, counsel for the
dominant group, either the management or bankers or the two working in harmony, will frequently be found in the key positions in the reorganization. In the
selection of attorneys to represent protective committees and to serve in other
capacities, counsel for the controlling group will exert considerable influence.
Such attorneys are frequently found in the position which will probably wield
the greatest influence and accordingly carry the largest rewards. 4
Part I of the Report concludes with the admonition that "[i]t is essential that
renewed emphasis be given to the fact that representatives of security holders in
reorganization occupy a fiduciary position. It is intolerable that they or their
lawyers should possess dual or multiple interests."3 "
It is odd that Smith's summary of the activities of the Protective Committee
Study makes no mention of Douglas's attacks on the bankruptcy bar in the hearings or in the final report. 6 Instead, he quotes an innocuous passage from the
Protective Committee Study and sublimely concludes that "[t]o address these
concerns, the Protective Committee Study recommended an independent trustee,
one free of any 'interest'." 37 He relies on an article by Robert Swaine, who was
extremely hostile to Douglas and the Protective Committee Study, and whose
firm was lambasted--by name--by Douglas, to summarize the eight volumes of
the Report. 8 Nowhere is there even a mention, much less a recognition, of
Douglas's disgust at the ethics of the bankruptcy attorneys of the era. As the
above indicates; however, Douglas was extremely dissatisfied with the state of
the bankruptcy bar and reserved much of his harshest criticism for it. 9
33. Id. at 215-16. Douglas's views were not unique. See

MAX LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS

(1933)

(describing receivership of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company in 1925).
34. Id. at 211-12.
35. Id. at 897.
36. Even Swaine at least took note of Douglas's attacks, although, of course, he disagreed with them. See
Swaine, supra note 30, at 258.
37. Smith, supra note 2, at 339.
38. See supra note 30 (describing Swaine's criticism of Douglas and the Report of the Protective Committee
Study).
39. Of course, this is not to say that Douglas was justified in his criticisms of the bankruptcy bar; it is simply
to say that Douglas was clearly troubled by the long-standing ethical lapses by bankruptcy attorneys.
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Given this avalanche of history which documents the deplorable ethics of the
bankruptcy bar prior to the Chandler Act, the only reasonable conclusion which can
be drawn is that the traditional view of history is correct. In turn, it is evident that a
whitewashed version of history is insupportable. Thus, while I and other members
of the bankruptcy bar would certainly like to accept the portrayal of bankruptcy's
ethical history provided by Mr. Smith, I, like almost every other scholar, judge, and
lawyer who has reviewed the historical record, am unable to do so.
Smith also accuses me of engaging in ad hominem attack and general incivility
in my observation that the disinterestedness requirement falls hardest on large
firms." Despite his zealousness to construe what I wrote as an attack on the
motives of large firms in seeking the proposed amendments, I never said any
such thing. I will simply repeat what I stated the first time: "[I]t appears that
this concern is animated by a sense that the disinterestedness requirement falls
disproportionately hard on large law firms who will often have as clients large
lenders and other creditors who the firm will be representing in other unrelated
matters." What I said is quite clear and quite contrary to what Smith claims I
1
said. There is no ad hominem attack and no allegation of improper motives." I
simply made the empirical observation that the disinterestedness requirement
tends to fall harder on large firms than others, disqualifying them from potentially lucrative representations of debtors in possession for which they would be eligible absent the presence of the disinterestedness requirement.
Smith's rhetoric is especially puzzling, however, in that this is an empirical
observation with which he agrees!42 It is unclear to me how this observation is
appropriate when Smith makes it, but the identical observation is uncivil and ad
40. Smith, supra note 2, at manuscript 4, 51. He also points to my invocation of "irrelevant but sensational
history and cases" as evidence of incivility. As discussed above, this element of his criticism is based on the
faulty premise that these cases are irrelevant to the enactment of the disinterestedness requirement.
41. Other commentators, by contrast, have been much more direct in accusing large firms of selfish motives
in advocating the repeal of disinterestedness. See, e.g., G. Ray Warner, Of Grinches,Alchemy and Disinterestedness: The Commission's Magically Disappearing Conflicts of Interest, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 423
(1997). Warner writes:
Mary Megafirm had wanted only one thing from Santa. Over the years, she had grown bigger and
bigger, and by now she had pretty much outgrown the professional qualification rules. She had
never much liked that nasty and bothersome 'disinterestedness' standard, but in recent years the disinterestedness standard was making it harder and harder to play with her Megafirm relatives in really fun mega-bankruptcies.
Id. at 423.
42. He makes this point in at least two different places. See Smith, supra note 2, at 357-58,
If the bilateral litigation rule does apply to the entire case, as suggested by some, including
Professor Zywicki, we will have closed the door opened by the Bankruptcy Code to the representation of trustees and debtors in possession by larger firms. As happened once before, law firms of
any size will abandon the representation of trustees and debtors in possession.
He also argues that if the disinterestedness requirement is retained,
Professor Westbrook's concerns will be realized; the pool of available talent to represent debtors in
possession will be dramatically diminished. For a slightly different reason, this occurred in the wake
of the Protective Committee Study and the Chandler Act Amendments. Major law firms abandoned
the reorganization practice. When the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
looked at reorganizations in the 1970's there were no Wall Street law firms involved in the practice.
...Before we cause another exodus, we need to give serious consideration to what we are doing.
Id. at 368.
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hominem in nature when I utter it.43 Before being fitted for my tweed professor's
jacket, I practiced bankruptcy with a large firm. I have seen up close how difficult it sometimes can be for large firms to squeeze through the eye of the disinterestedness needle (although many do so with great regularity). I understand
quite well that occasional disqualification of large firm lawyers from representing some debtors in possession in some cases is an unfortunate consequence of
the disinterestedness requirement. Thus, we are in agreement that the disinterestedness requirement falls hardest on large firms.
But the degree to which the disinterestedness requirement actually disqualifies
large firms and the amount of harm this causes to the bankruptcy system remain
open to debate. For his part, Smith only offers an unsubstantiated doomsday scenario whereby all large firms are disqualified from representing debtors in possession in all cases, eventually abandoning the practice of bankruptcy completely. There are several problems with this analysis.
In part, this scenario is based on Smith's faulty impression that retaining the
current disinterestedness standard somehow works a change in the law. I must
confess to some confusion as to the basis for Smith's belief that a reaffirmation
of the status quo changes anything at all. Be that as it may, under the existing
regime, large firms qualify to represent debtors in possession with regularity, and
it is not evident why merely retaining the existing standard would change that
result at all, much less bring about the doomsday scenario envisioned by Smith.
Moreover, even if Smith is correct in his belief that retaining the current standard will disqualify large firms from ever representing debtors, he is incorrect in
arguing that they will be chased out of the bankruptcy system completely. My
personal experience suggests that only a minority of large law firms actually ever
seek to represent debtors, preferring to represent lenders and other creditors for
whom disinterestedness is irrelevant. Firms who are disqualified from representing debtors can simply flip-over and represent creditors. Often, a firm will simply represent the very same party that rendered it non-disinterested in the first
place. Thus, contrary to Smith's belief, large firms will not abandon bankruptcy
practice, although they may shift from representing debtors to representing creditors. The bankruptcy system will still benefit from their expertise and ability; it
will just be applied in a different way.
More fundamentally, Smith's analysis asks the wrong question. Merely agreeing that some large firms are disqualified from representing some debtors in possession in some cases does not resolve the issue. The question is comparative
and relative, not absolute. The relevant question is whether the occasional disqualification of certain firms from representing debtors in possession works an
intolerable hardship on the bankruptcy system as a whole, and whether the costs
exceed the benefits of retaining the disinterestedness requirement.
43. Smith's sensitivity to the perceived allegations of self-interested motives is ironic considering that he
has, on another occasion, criticized the efforts by "special interest groups" to influence the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission. See What Will Happen to the Commission 's Report? 31 BANKR. COURT
DECISIONS, Issue 13 (Nov. 11, 1997) (statement of Gerald Smith). Apparently, the classification of what constitutes a "special interest group" is in the eye of the beholder.
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The issue requires balancing competing concerns: Is the cost of disqualifying
some highly-skilled lawyers from representing some debtors in possession justified when weighed against the benefits of the disinterestedness rule and the
recognition that other adequate counsel will be available. Reasonable minds can
differ in weighing these costs and benefits. Casual empiricism suggests that the
cost to the bankruptcy system of the current rule is minimal in that there is a sufficiently large number of competent bankruptcy lawyers who meet the standards
of disinterestedness so a debtor in possession will be able to find adequate representation. The purported problem of excluding all qualified counsel appears to
be largely hypothetical. Thus, while there is obviously some cost to those particular lawyers disqualified by the disinterestedness rule, the cost to the overall
bankruptcy system seems to be quite small."
To the extent that there actually is some cost to the bankruptcy system from the
disqualification of some, primarily large firms, lawyers, those costs must still be
weighed against the offsetting benefits of requiring disinterestedness. It is not
sufficient simply to observe that large firm counsel will be disqualified without
considering the availability of alternative counsel and the offsetting benefits of
the disinterestedness rule. It also must be shown that large firms will not be the
only beneficiaries of the change--that debtors, creditors, and the bankruptcy system as a whole will also benefit from the change. The relevant question is
whether, after the change, the overall system improved, in light of the costs and
benefits generated. Smith's arguments simply fail to carry this burden.
III. CONCLUSION

Should we eliminate the disinterestedness requirement for a debtor in possession's professionals? Despite the contributions of Charles Wolfram and Gerald
Smith in this Symposium, my convictions remain unshaken. Given the acknowledged benefits of disinterestedness, they simply have not identified the problem
to which abolition of the disinterestedness requirement for professionals representing debtors in possession is the best solution. Targeted reforms have been
recommended to deal with particular problems. Further discussion is warranted.
But the bankruptcy system has survived for twenty years with the requirement
that lawyers for debtors in possession must be disinterested. Disinterestedness
has been a part of the bankruptcy system for trustees and their professionals for
44. Of course, bankruptcy is not unique in restricting the opportunities for large firms to represent certain
types of clients. For instance, large firms rarely represent individual plaintiffs who are suing large corporations
in employment law cases. Clearly, this is a detriment to those plaintiffs, many of whom have suffered intense
discrimination or harassment and who might benefit from large-firm representation. Clearly, there also is a loss
to the public if meritorious claims receive inadequate representation. Similarly, plaintiffs in securities lawsuits
against large corporations are rarely represented by large firms, despite the unarguable importance of those proceedings for the individual plaintiffs and the public. In each of these situations, we recognize that large firm
counsel will be excluded from undertaking the representation for one reason or another (not always purely ethical reasons), but also recognize that countervailing policies justify this result. Moreover, although these individuals do not receive the representation of large firms, they do, in fact, receive competent representation; thus,
there is minimal harm to the public interest from the exclusion of large firms from this work. The retention or
repeal of the disinterestedness requirement should turn on similar inquiries and should require a finding that,
on net, there is a tangible harm to the public interest as a result of the impact of strict ethical rules in excluding
large firm lawyers from representing debtors in bankruptcy.
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half a century, and no one is calling for its elimination in that context. By and
large, the system has avoided the plague of self-dealing and corruption which
characterized earlier periods of bankruptcy practice, and to which the system still
remains vulnerable. Most alleged costs, such as disqualification of all competent
counsel or expulsion of all large firms from bankruptcy practice, are unproven
and exaggerated. While retaining the disinterestedness requirement may cause
certain lawyers to lose out on some of the spoils of bankruptcy practice, there
simply is no identifiable harm to the bankruptcy system which justifies elimination of the disinterestedness requirement for DIP professionals. Until someone
identifies what problems exist which can be fixed only by abandoning disinterestedness and all its attendant benefits, there is simply no reason to take such a
drastic step.
Clarify the case law. Make needed reforms. Continue the debate. But given
the history and structural problems of the bankruptcy system, retain disinterestedness until it is demonstrated why it must be scrapped.

